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 An Incomplete Contracting Model of  
Governance Structure Variety in Franchising 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
For the purpose of explaining governance structure variety in franchising, we 
explore the impact of governance structure on the incentives to invest in specific 
assets for the franchisor as well as the distributors. Wholly-owned, wholly-franchised, 
and mixed (dual distribution) franchise systems are considered. Circumstances are 
identified when a dual distribution governance structure uniquely allocates efficient 
ownership over assets. Whether dual distribution benefits are realized in a franchise or 
a cooperative franchise depends on whether most value is added upstream or 
downstream. A disadvantage of a dual distribution system is the deterioration of the 
investment incentives of the party having no authority, i.e. either the company-owned 
outlet manager in a traditional franchise or the franchisor in a cooperative franchise. A 
wholly-franchised system may therefore be efficient even when unique dual 
distribution benefits are present. A necessary condition for the efficiency of a dual 
distribution governance structure is a positive systemic effect, not the value of the 
brand name or location (or other) differences between outlets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Franchising is an important business phenomenon. There are an estimated 1,500 
different franchisors (franchise business companies) operating in the U.S; and there 
are believed to be more than 760,000 franchise businesses in the U.S. The franchising 
industry and businesses employs over 18 million people in the U.S. It is estimated that 
franchise businesses were responsible for over $1.53 trillion in economic output. It is 
also found that sales through franchise have accounted for a significant portion in the 
following industries: quick service restaurants (56.3%), lodging (18.2%), retail food 
(14.2%) and full service restaurants (13.1%) (Reynolds 2004). 
Observation suggests that there is considerable governance structure variety in 
franchising. Blair and Lafontaine (2005, p88) provide statistics regarding the number 
of wholly franchised enterprises (where all outlets are owned by independent 
franchisees), dual distribution franchising (involving the coexistence of both 
franchisor-owned distributors and independent franchisees), and entirely company 
owned enterprises (where all outlets are owned by the franchisor). Well known 
examples of the first type are Baskin-Robbins USA Co. and Allegra Print & Imaging, 
while McDonalds, 7-Eleven Inc., and Jackson Hewitt Tax Service are examples of the 
second type. Dual distribution franchising is most widespread of these governance 
structures, while the third type, i.e. the franchisor owns all outlets, is rare. The 
business world adopts also other governance structures. An example is credit card 
company VISA where the franchisees own the brand and the business format 
regarding electronic payments. Other examples of cooperative franchises are Best 
Western hotels, ACE Hardware, True Value hardware, and Straw Hut Pizza. In these 
enterprises, either all outlets together own the brand and the business format, or some 
outlets own the brand and the business format. We label the former as cooperative 
franchising and the latter as dual distribution cooperative franchising. 
Recent empirical work shows that dual distribution franchising is stable over 
time, i.e. the percentage of company ownership remains fixed after the early years in 
franchising and firms change their number of both company-owned and franchised 
outlets as they grow or decline. Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) show that the percentage 
of company-owned outlets is about 15% on average. However, there are substantial 
cross- and within-sector differences. For example, their study shows that restaurant 
chains have a higher percentage of company-owned outlets on average than the 
construction and maintenance sectors. They show also that there are substantial 
differences within sectors (Lafontaine and Shaw 2005). For example, the auto rental 
companies Hertz and National have high levels of company ownership (66% and 40% 
respectively), while Budget, Thrifty, and Dollar have much lower levels of company 
ownership. Their regression results show a strong positive relationship between brand 
value and the percentage of company-owned outlets. 
A franchise is a vertical relationship between a franchisor and many franchisees. 
Combs et al. (2004, P907) characterize a franchise by ‘… one firm (the franchisor) 
sells the right to market goods or services under its brand name and using its business 
practices to a second firm (the franchisee)’. This definition stresses the importance of 
the brand and the business format in franchising, and the right to market goods or 
services. We will address the relationship between the investment in specific assets, 
like the brand name and local market knowledge, and governance structure, i.e. the 
allocation of rights. A standard way of delineating a governance structure is to 
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distinguish income and decision rights (Hansmann 1996).1 Income rights address the 
question ‘How are benefits and costs allocated?’, i.e. they specify the rights to receive 
the benefits, and obligations to pay the costs, that are associated with the use of an 
asset. For example, a franchise has to choose the level of the royalty rate and the 
franchise fee. Other important themes regarding income rights are financing, cost 
allocation schemes, and the effects of horizontal as well as vertical competition. 
Decision rights in the form of authority and responsibility address the question ‘Who 
has authority or control?’, i.e. they concern all rights and rules regarding the 
deployment and use of assets. For example, a franchise chain has to decide how many 
outlets will be company-owned. Important themes regarding authority are its 
allocation (‘make-or-buy’ decision), formal versus real authority, relational contracts, 
access, decision control (ratification, monitoring), decision management (initiation, 
implementation), task design, conflict resolution, and enforcement mechanisms.2    
The main aim of this article is to develop an incomplete contracting theory 
regarding governance structure variety in franchising. 3  More specifically, the 
relationship between the specific investments of all parties in the franchise system and 
its efficient governance structure is investigated. Franchisees and the franchisor invest 
in different activities. For example, franchisees invest in local advertising and 
customer service, quality control, human resource management, and product 
innovation (Sorenson and Sørensen 2001), while the franchisor invests in system-
specific assets like know-how and the brand name (Klein and Leffler 1981, Norton 
1988). 4  The value generated by these investments may depend on governance 
structure, as indicated by the above observations about widespread stable dual 
distribution. This is captured by the specification of a unique dual distribution benefit, 
i.e. a systemic effect.5 
                                               
1
 Saloner et al. (2001) distinguish incentives and authority. 
2
 Decision rights are relevant next to income rights because contracts are in general incomplete, due to 
the complexity of the transaction or the vagueness of language. Incomplete contracts are completed  by 
the allocation of authority in order to decide in circumstances not covered by the contract. 
3 Windsperger and Dant (2006) provide support for this perspective in a franchising context. 
4 The interests of the franchisees and the franchisor are usually not completely aligned with the interests 
of the entire franchise system. Illustrations are the concerns about free-riding by franchisees on the 
brand name and territorial encroachment of franchisors adding new units of their brand proximately to 
their franchisees’ existing units (Kalnins 2004). It is therefore assumed that each party maximizes its 
own profit, not the profits of the franchise system. 
5 Many ideas regarding the modeling of a dual distribution benefit have been proposed in the literature. 
Full company ownership entails stronger investment incentives for the franchisor, but it may increase 
monitoring costs to prevent shirking, capital costs and search costs (Brickley and Dark 1987, Brickley 
et al. 1991,  Blair and Kaserman 1994, Minkler and Park, 1994). Lewin-Solomon (1999) argues that a 
dual distribution franchise enhances innovation by providing a credible signal to (potential) franchisees 
that only profitable innovations will be implemented. Sorenson and Sørensen (2001) explain the 
franchise mix as the result of a trade-off between exploration (franchising) and exploitation (company-
owned units) in organizational learning. The relative compensation literature highlights the ‘ratcheting’ 
of incentives (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Green and Stokey 1983). Complementarities along the lines of 
Bradach (1997) are central in the system of attributes literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, 1994). 
Fisher and Harrington (1996) is an example outside the franchising literature, which may provide a way 
of modeling the evidence that larger, urban units that are close to headquarters are more likely to be 
company owned (see Lafontaine and Slade (2001) for a review). The size of the dual distribution 
benefit is treated as an exogenous parameter in our model in order to highlight the relationship between 
investment incentives and governance structure. This parameter is therefore to be interpreted as a 
reduced form of an underlying interaction process. 
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A governance structure has an impact on the incentive to invest because it 
allocates ownership over assets.6 The value of an efficient governance structure is that 
it provides all parties with incentives to invest in such a way that the entire franchise 
system generates the highest value. We compare wholly-franchised systems, wholly-
owned systems, and mixed/dual distribution systems.7 Circumstances are identified 
when dual distribution is the unique governance structure that induces investment by 
the various parties exactly when it is efficient to do so. To illustrate, suppose 
McDonald’s has two restaurant outlets, one in NYC and the other in Quincy, IL. 
Further, imagine that the overall chain can benefit from knowing the upcoming trends 
in consumer tastes, styles, and behavioral attitudes by helping the McDonald’s 
franchisor implement new programs. Assume also that acquiring this knowledge is 
costly for the restaurant manager. Given that NYC is a cosmopolitan city, it is less 
costly for the manager there to note, measure, and communicate this information than 
at the Quincy location. So while the NYC outlet is in a better position to acquire this 
knowledge, its incentive to do so depends on the degree of ownership it has over these 
benefits. In other words, if the Quincy location free rides of NYC’s marketing 
research, then the NYC manager is less inclined to undertake the costs than if this 
manager actually owned a stake in the benefit. The idea is thus, that dual-distribution 
governance with the NYC manager owning the NYC outlet and the McDonald’s 
franchisor owning the Quincy outlet is the most efficient. 
The trade-offs involved in the determination in the efficient governance 
structure are addressed by answering two questions: What is the incentive to invest for 
each party in the franchise system in each governance structure? Which governance 
structures are efficient under which circumstances? The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, the incentive to invest is determined for 
each party in each governance structure. Section 4 identifies the efficient governance 
structures. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model 
 
This section presents a non-cooperative game theoretic model of the interactions 
between governance structure and the investment of the parties in the franchise 
system. We have to specify therefore the decision making parties, the investment and 
governance possibilities, the payoffs, and the sequence of decisions. 8  Figure 1 
presents a franchise system consisting of three parties: party 1 is the franchisor 
considering a brand / trademark investment generating a value A for the franchise 
system, party 2 is a distributor considering an investment generating a value B for the 
franchise system, and party 3 is a distributor considering an investment generating a 
value C (>B) for the franchise system. The cost of investment by party i is ki when 
party i invests, otherwise it is 0. 
                                               
6 Brickley et al. (1991), Gallini and Lutz (1992), Mathewson and Winter (1994), Lutz (1995) and Dutta 
et al. (1995) emphasize already the importance of ownership in determining the incentives to invest in 
different governance structures from a transaction cost economics perspective. 
7
 Multiple channels of distribution have been studied before, like the coexistence of employees and 
subcontractors to perform trucking services (Baker and Hubbard 2004), the coexistence of spot and 
contract markets in many agricultural markets (Hendrikse 2007), and the marketing literature on dual 
channels (Balasubramanian 1998, Chiang et al. 2003, Liu and Zhang 2006, Purohit 1997, Zettelmeyer 
2000). 
8
 Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) show that experienced franchisors maintain a fixed percentage of 
company-owned outlets. Franchises establish this stable percentage usually after seven years. Our 
(equilibrium) model is addressing these established franchises. 
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Figure 1: The three parties 
 
In order to determine the impact of governance structure on the incentive to 
invest of each party, seven governance structures regarding the three parties are 
distinguished in figure 2. A cross in a box indicates that this party has 
authority/power. Governance structure I entails that all outlets are company owned, 
i.e. the franchisor has all the power. There are two dual distribution governance 
structures when the franchisor has power. The high value franchisee (i.e. party 3) is 
independent in governance structure II and has therefore power, while the low value 
franchisee (i.e. party 2) has no power. The power of the distributors is reversed in 
governance structure III.910  The entire chain is franchised in governance structure IV. 
Finally, three cooperative franchises are distinguished. A cooperative franchise is 
characterized by the assets of the franchisor being owned by one or both distributors. 
In governance structure V, the two stores have the ownership over the entire network. 
Governance structure V is called a cooperative franchise. There are two dual 
distribution cooperative franchises as well. The low value distributor owns the brand 
in governance structure VI, while the high value distributor owns the brand in 
governance structure 
VII.
                                               
9
 A franchise system consisting of just 2 distributors is a stylized modeling of reality. However, the 
evidence reported in the introduction section indicates that firms change their number of both 
company-owned and franchised outlets according to a fixed ratio as they grow or decline. It suffices 
therefore to limit the model to the dual distribution governance structures considered here. Moreover, it 
turns out that our governance structure results are not affected by having many distributors generating 
value B and many distributors generating value C. If party 2 is franchised and party 3 is the manager of 
a company-owned outlet, then governance structure III with 17 party 2 outlets and 3 party 3 outlets 
represents the finding of Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) that the percentage of company-owned outlets is 
about 15% on average.  
10
 Differences in the individual characteristics of the outlets and franchisees, e.g. geographic proximity 
to each other, has been an important in the agency models (Brickley and Dark 1987).   
B C 
Franchisor 
Distributors 
A 
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The previous section has motivated extensively that dual distribution may result 
in unique benefits. These dual distribution benefits may originate anywhere in the 
franchise system and may be allocated to one or more parties. A general way to 
describe the system effects of an investment in a specific governance structure 
generating a dual distribution effect is to define a parameter ijg, where i,j = 1,2,3 and 
g= II, III, VI, VII. Parameter ijg is to be interpreted as the synergy effect of the value 
of the investment of party i benefiting party j in dual distribution governance structure 
g. A number of cases may be illuminating. First, if the dual distribution benefit is a 
horizontal externality, then 1jg=0 for j=1,2,3 and g=II,III,VI,VII. If the dual 
distribution benefit is a vertical externality, then i1g>0 for i=1,2,3 and g= II, III, VI, 
VII. Second, if the dual distribution benefit is a vertical externality, then ijg0 for 
1∈{i,j} and ij. Finally, if there is a positive (negative) dual distribution effect of the 
investment of party 2 and the size of this effect does not depend on the specific dual 
distribution governance structure, then 21g+ 22g+ 23g> (<) 1 for g=II, III, VI, VII. 
The next two sections determine the equilibrium features of the above model. In 
order to keep the analysis of the model as simple as possible, we analyze the case 
where the dual distribution benefit arises only from the investment of either party 2 or 
3, all the dual distribution benefits of an investment are captured by one party in each 
 
 
 
II Dual distribution franchise with 
low value distributor 
 
 
 
 
III Dual distribution franchise with high 
value distributor 
 
 
IV Wholly franchised 
 
 
 
V Cooperative franchise 
 
 
 
 
VI Dual distribution cooperative 
franchise with low value distributor 
 
 
 
VII Dual distribution cooperative 
franchise with high value distributor 
 
 
 
 
I Wholly company owned 
 
Figure 2: Seven governance structures 
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governance structure, and the effect of the investment of party 2 and party 3 is 
identical. Denote the identical synergistic effect by . We limit ourselves to the 
analysis of this model because it highlights already the main investment incentive 
effects of the various governance structures. Table 1 presents the specification of ijg 
of the model to be analyzed in the next two sections. The values 1jg=0 reflect the first 
assumption, i.e. no dual distribution benefit arises from the investment of party 1. The 
second assumption, i.e. all the dual distribution benefits of an investment are captured 
by one party, is reflected in two of the parameters of the set {i1g , i2g , i3g} for i=2,3 
and g=II, III, VI, VII being equal to 0.11 
 
             
 
11 12 13 21 22 23 31 32 33 
II 0 0 0  0 0 0 0  
III 0 0 0 0  0  0 0 
VI 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  
VII 0 0 0 0  0 0 0  
 
Table 1: Specification of ijg 
 
Table 2 presents the payoff of each party in every governance structure when all 
parties invest. These payoffs reflect the value and costs of investment and the impact 
of governance structure. (The Appendix motivates these payoffs by presenting the 
underlying characteristic function forms.) For example, the franchisor enjoys a payoff 
A+B-k1 when he invests in governance structure II. Revenue A is received due to 
owning the brand/trademark and revenue B is due to ownership of the outlet of party 2. 
The costs of investment are k1. Party 2 receives no revenues due to lack of ownership of 
assets, while the costs of investment are born by him. Party 3 receives a dual 
distribution benefit generated by his investment and pays his costs of investment. 
 
             
Franchisor Party 2 Party 3 
I A+B+C-k1 -k2 -k3 
II A+B-k1 -k2 C-k3 
III A+C-k1 B-k2 -k3 
IV A-k1 B-k2 C-k3 
V -k1 A/2+B-k2 A/2+C-k3 
VI -k1 A+B-k2 C-k3 
VII -k1 B-k2 A+C-k3 
 
Table 2: Payoff of each party in every governance structures when all parties invest 
 
The final ingredient of the non-cooperative game theoretic model to be specified 
is the sequence of decisions. Investment decisions are embedded in a governance 
structure. This implies that the governance structure is determined before the 
                                               
11
 Notice that this specification allows us to concentrate completely on the investment incentive effects 
of a governance structure, without considering either horizontal or vertical externalities. A horizontal 
externality will be involved when for most dual distribution governance structures i2g0  i3g for 
i=2,3. Similarly, a vertical externality will be involved when for most dual distribution governance 
structures iig0 i1g for i=2,3. 
Governance 
structure 
Payoff 
g 
 9 
investment choices. The first stage of the game is therefore the governance structure 
stage, while investment decisions are determined in the second stage of the game. 
Three parties are taking investment decisions in the second stage of the game. Each 
player decides between investing and not investing in specific assets. The sequence of 
their decisions does not matter due to our specification of the payoffs. We choose to 
have the choice of the franchisor first, subsequently the choice of party 2, and finally 
the choice of party 3.  The appendix depicts the extensive form of the game. 
The sequence of decisions is in line with the classic incomplete contracting 
models of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), i.e. investment 
decisions are preceded by the determination of governance structure. A governance 
structure allocates the bargaining strength of each party in the first stage, while 
bargaining positions are determined by the investment choices in the second stage. An 
investment in the second stage deteriorates the bargaining position of the investing 
party due to the incompleteness of contracts.12 The relationship between the first and 
the second stage is that the allocation of bargaining power by the governance structure 
in the first stage determines the incentive to invest in the second stage. (A cross in a 
box in figure 2 indicates that this party has the residual control / power / authority to 
decide in unforeseen circumstances.) A party is willing to deteriorate its bargaining 
position in the second stage by choosing to invest in specific assets when the 
prevailing governance structure allocates sufficient power to this party to capture a 
share of the quasi-surplus in the ex post bargaining process to cover the sunk costs of 
investment.  
 
3. Equilibrium investment 
 
The previous section has specified the game theoretic model in terms of the 
parties, the governance and investment alternatives, the payoffs, and the sequence of 
decisions. This section presents the equilibrium investment decision of each party. 
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is determined by the method of 
backward induction. It entails that the investment decisions in the second stage of the 
game are addressed first, given the choice of governance structure. A party chooses 
either to invest or not to invest. Investment by party i entails a cost ki for this party 
and generates value. If a party does not invest, then there are no costs of investment 
and no value is generated. A party invests when the payoff of investment is higher 
than the payoff of not investing. Subsequently, the choice of governance structure is 
addressed, anticipating the equilibrium investment decisions in the next stage of the 
game.  
Figure 3 presents the payoffs of the subgame perfect equilibrium investment 
decisions of all parties in every governance structure for all possible values of k2 and 
k3 when k1A and >1.13 The first (second, third) number in the vector after each 
governance structure is the subgame perfect equilibrium payoff of party 1 (2, 3). For 
example, if k3C and governance structure II is actual, then parties 1 and 3 will 
invest (resulting in positive payoffs A-k1 and C- k3, respectively) and party 2 does 
                                               
12
 Contractual incompleteness entails that it is hard to verify ex post that a party has made an 
investment and the associated costs. Examples are investments in system-specific assets, like the brand 
name and the business format, as well as local assets, like knowledge about the local market and local 
operations. The above model specifies therefore that the costs of investment are always paid by the 
investing party, regardless the governance structure. 
13
 The case k1>A is presented by replacing the payoff A-k1 of the franchisor by 0 in all governance 
structures in figure 1. 
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not invest (resulting in payoff 0). Party 2 will never invest in governance structure II 
because no bargaining power is allocated to party 2.  Party 3 recoups its investment 
costs in governance structure II only when k3C. Governance structure II does not 
allocate sufficient bargaining power to party 3 to induce investment when k3>C. 
 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
III: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
V: (0, B-k2, 0) 
VI: (0, B-k2, 0) 
VII: (0, B-k2, 0) 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
III: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
V: (0, 0, 0) 
VI: (0, B-k2, 0)  
VII: (0, B-k2, 0) 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
III: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
V: (0, 0, 0) 
VI: (0, 0, 0) 
VII: (0, 0, 0) 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
III: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
V: (0, B-k2, 0) 
VI: (0, B-k2, C-k3) 
VII: (0, B-k2, C-k3) 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
III: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
V: (0, 0, 0) 
VI: (0, B-k2, C-k3) 
VII: (0, B-k2, C-k3) 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
III: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
V: (0, 0, 0) 
VI: (0, 0, C-k3) 
VII: (0, 0, C-k3) 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
III: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, B-k2, C-k3) 
V: (0, B-k2, C-k3) 
VI: (0, B-k2, C-k3) 
VII: (0, B-k2, C-k3) 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
III: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
V: (0, 0, C-k3) 
VI: (0, B-k2, C-k3) 
VII: (0, B-k2, C-k3) 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
III: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
V: (0, 0, C-k3) 
VI: (0, 0, C-k3) 
VII: (0, 0, C-k3) 
 
 
Figure 3: Subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs when k1  A and  >1 
 
4. Efficient governance 
 
This section formulates results regarding the efficient governance structure. First 
best efficiency entails that the highest possible surplus is generated. Consider the case 
k1≤A. Generation of the highest surplus requires that party 2 (3) invests only when 
k2B (k3C), while party 1 should always invest. Figure 3 shows governance 
structure II is the unique first best efficient governance structure when k2>B and 
k3C, while governance structure III is the unique first best efficient governance 
structure when k2B and k3>C. The governance structures I-IV are first best 
efficient when k2>B and k3>C. Finally, there is no first best governance structure 
when k2B and k3C. The reason is that a dual distribution governance structure is 
required to generate the first best outcome. However, a dual distribution governance 
structure has always one party without power, and therefore no incentive to invest, 
even when k1≤A, k2B and k3C. Section 4.1 identifies the second best governance 
structures, while section 4.2 formulates managerial implications. 
 
4.1 Second best governance structures  
Second best efficiency of a governance structure entails that the sum of the 
payoffs of the three players in this governance structure is at least as high as the sum 
k2 
C 
C 
B B 
k3 
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of the payoffs of the three players in any other governance structure. The second best 
efficient governance structures are determined using figure 3, and are presented in 
figure 4, when there is a positive, but limited, dual distribution externality.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Second best efficient governance structures when k1≤A and 1<< 1+B/C 
 
A number of results can be formulated. First, the dual distribution cooperative 
franchises VI and VII are identical in terms of efficiency. The reason is that the 
franchisor will not invest in these governance structures in equilibrium due to not 
having any power. Ownership of the assets of the franchisor generates therefore no 
revenues for the owner.  
Second, cooperative franchise V is never efficient. It is dominated by the dual 
distribution cooperative franchises because they generate the positive dual distribution 
externality, whereas V does not.  
Third, governance structure I is never a unique efficient governance structure. 
The distributors have no power in governance structure I, and therefore no incentive 
to invest. Governance structure I is only efficient when the two distributors do not 
invest due to the high costs of their investments. If k2B and k3C, then the 
franchisor is the only party investing in the governance structures I-IV. (Nobody 
invests in the governance structures V-VII. They are inefficient.) However, if one of 
these inequalities does not hold, then I is always strictly dominated by either II, III or 
IV. The franchisor and at least one of the sellers will invest in the governance 
                                               
14
 The upward sloping line in the figures 2 and 3 is characterized by k3=(C-B)+k2. 
 
IV 
or 
VI=VII 
II 
I-IV III 
II 
III 
VI=VII 
VI=VII 
k3 
k2 
C 
C-(-1)B 
B-(-1)C       B-(A-k1)    B 
 
C-(A-k1) 
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structures II-IV, whereas the franchisor is the only party investing in governance 
structure I. 
Fourth, governance structure III is the unique efficient governance structure in 
the north-west rectangle. Seller C never invests when k3>C because the costs of 
investment are too high, regardless the choice of governance structure. This is 
efficient. Governance structures I-IV are efficient in inducing the efficient decision by 
the franchisor. The franchisor does not invest in the cooperative franchises V-VII due 
to a lack of power. These governance structures are therefore inefficient. Party 2 does 
not invest in the governance structures I and II because there is no incentive to invest 
due to the lack of power. These governance structures are inefficient because the 
value generated by party 2 is larger than its costs. However, party 2 invests in the 
governance structures III and IV due to having sufficient power. Governance structure 
III strictly dominates governance structure IV when there are positive dual 
distribution externalities, i.e. >1, because the surplus B-k2 generated by seller B in 
governance structure III is larger than the surplus B-k2>0 of party 2 generated in 
governance structure IV.  
Fifth, a similar reasoning applies to governance structure II being uniquely 
efficient in the south-east rectangle. It discourages efficiently investment by party 2 
with its relatively high costs of investment, while party 3 invests and generates the 
dual distribution externality. 
Sixth, the efficient governance structure choice in the south-west depends on the 
parameter values. The results are presented in two stages. First, consider the 
efficiency of governance structures with the franchisor having authority. The efficient 
governance structure is determined by comparing the governance structures II, III, and 
IV. If the franchisor has power, then governance structure IV is the unique efficient 
governance structure choice when k2 and k3 are small and  is limited. The 
intermediate investment incentives for both distributors in governance structure IV 
create more value than the strong investment incentive for either party 2 in 
governance structure III or party 3 in governance structure II when the size of the dual 
distribution externality is limited, i.e. <1+B/C. The attractiveness of governance 
structure IV is that both distributors have an incentive to invest because each of them 
has power. However, the positive dual distribution externality cannot emerge. 
Governance structures II and III have the advantage of generating the positive dual 
distribution externality, but only the independent distributor invests. The value of 
having two distributors investing without generating the dual distribution externality 
dominates the generation of the dual distribution externality by having just one 
investing distributor when the dual distribution externality is not too large. However, 
if the cost of investment of party 2 (3) increase above B-(-1)C (C-(-1)B), then 
governance structure II (III) dominates governance structure IV. Second, the efficient 
governance structure when the franchisor has authority is compared with the efficient 
governance structure when the franchisor has no authority, i.e. governance structure 
VI=VII. Governance structure II dominates the governance structures VI and VII 
when k2B-(A-k1), i.e. the dual distribution externality is limited or the value of the 
brand is substantial. II as well as VI and VII induce investment by party 3, but the 
costs of investment by party 2 in governance structures VI and VII is too high from an 
efficiency perspective in order to sacrifice the value generating investment by the 
franchisor in governance structure II. A similar argument applies regarding 
governance structure III dominating the governance structures VI and VII when 
k3C-(A-k1). The comparison between IV and VI=VII is driven by the dual 
distribution externality effect. Choosing between allocating authority to the franchisor 
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in governance structure IV and taking away authority from the franchisor in the 
governance structures VI and VII entails a trade-off between sacrificing the 
generation of the dual distribution externality at both outlets versus sacrificing the 
value of brand development. If A-k1<(-1)(B+C), i.e. the value added of the brand is 
insufficient or the dual distribution externality is substantial, then governance 
structure IV is dominated by governance structure VI=VII. So, taking power away 
from the franchisor by switching to the dual distribution cooperative franchise VI or 
VII is efficient when the relative importance of the brand decreases. 
Notice that it is not necessary for dual distribution franchising being a unique 
efficient governance structure that B<C. The value generated by the independent 
distributor in a dual distribution governance structure is higher than the value 
generated by either one or two distributors in governance structure IV. This result 
shows that it is not necessary for the emergence of dual distribution that there are 
locational differences, or other differences between the distributors. System wide 
externalities are responsible for dual distribution being a unique, efficient governance 
structure. 
We have now covered the case 1<<1+B/C, i.e. a positive, but limited, dual 
distribution externalities. If there are substantial positive dual distribution 
externalities, i.e. 1+B/C, then the size of the south-west rectangle is zero. There are 
no parameter values for which governance structure IV is the unique efficient 
governance structure anymore. The intermediate investment incentives for both 
distributors in governance structure IV are not strong enough to override the strong 
investment incentives for either party 2 in governance structure III or party 3 in 
governance structure II. 
A figure similar to figure 3 can be determined when <1. It turns out that 
governance structure IV is first best efficient for all parameter values.15 It prevents on 
the one hand the emergence of the negative dual distribution externality in the 
governance structures II, III, VI and VII, and on the other hand the allocation of 
insufficient power to either the distributors in governance structure I or the franchisor 
in governance structure V. This result implies that dual distribution is due to the 
systemic effect , regardless the value of brand name, i.e. A-k1, or locational (or 
other) differences between outlets, i.e. B-k2 and C-k3. The importance of this systemic 
effect seems to be in line with the empirical result of Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) that 
dual distribution of established franchises is stable over time, i.e. the percentage of 
company ownership remains fixed after the early years in franchising and firms 
change their number of both company-owned and franchised outlets as they grow or 
decline. 
Finally, governance structure IV is also first best efficient for all parameter 
values when =1. It is the unique first best efficient governance structure when k2<B 
and k3<C. If k2B and k3<C, then also governance structure II is first best efficient. If 
k2<B and k3C, then also governance structure III is first best efficient. The 
governance structures I-IV are first best efficient when k2B and k3C. Cooperative 
franchises are never efficient when 1. 
 
4.2 Managerial implications 
This section formulates several managerial implications of our model. They 
relate to the second best efficient governance structure, the effect of changes in the 
parameters on the second best efficient governance structure, and sectoral differences. 
                                               
15
 If k2B and k3C, then governance structures I-III are also first best efficient. 
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First, if for specific parameter values the actual governance structure differs from the 
efficient governance structure predicted by the model, then this discrepancy has to be 
explained. Many problems are involved in doing such an exercise because the actual 
business world and a model are hardly ever a perfect match. However, if the model 
predicts that there are no circumstances for a certain governance to be efficient, then it 
entails that its occurrence is expected to be absent. Our results show that wholly–
company owned franchising, i.e. governance structure I, is not likely to occur. This is 
in line with the observations of Blair and Lafontaine (2005) that franchise systems 
with the franchisor owning all outlets are rare. Similarly, if there is a positive dual 
distribution benefit, i.e. >1, then dual distribution is predicted to be a unique efficient 
governance structure for a large set of parameter values. Again, this seems to be 
corroborated. Lafontaine and Shaw (2005, footnote 6) report that ‘… most chains 
operate what they see as the optimal proportion of company units. In the vast majority 
of cases, this proportion is neither 0% nor 100%’. It is therefore important to manage 
the systemic effect (Bradach 1997). Notice that the exact dual distribution governance 
structure to be expected is determined in our model by the relative importance of the 
value of investment of all parties, not just the value added by franchisor, e.g. brand 
name, or the franchisees, e.g. developing the local market. 
Second, the model implies a number of changes in the efficient governance 
structure due to changes in the exogenous parameters. Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) 
show that the percentage of company owned outlets increases when the value of the 
brand name increases, i.e. A-k1. Our model is inconclusive about this relationship 
because the dotted line in figure 4, its location being determined by the value of the 
brand name, is separating different dual distribution governance structures. However, 
there is an obvious relationship between the dual distribution benefit and the efficient 
governance structure. Dual distribution is absent when <1, while it is pervasive when 
>1. Figure 4 reinforces this relationship because the area where governance structure 
is efficient shrinks when  is increasing, i.e. a switch from wholly-franchised chain IV 
to a dual distribution chain is expected. Changes in the costs of investment of the 
distributors may also change the equilibrium percentage of dual distribution. A 
decrease in either k2 or k3, or an increase in either B or C, may decrease the 
percentage of company owned outlets because sacrificing the dual distribution benefit 
is attractive in order to restore the incentive to invest for all distributors (IV).       
Third, Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) show that established chains maintain a 
stable percentage of company-owned outlets, but that this percentage varies 
considerably across sectors. Some industries such as hotels (Kalnins 2004) exhibit 
much less dual distribution than others such as fast food. Our analysis indicates that 
the nature of this variation resides in unique dual distribution benefits and the relative 
importance of the value of the specific investments of all chain participants. If the 
percentage of company owned outlets is very low, then our model indicates that 
positive systemic effects are absent, regardless the value of the brand. 
 
5. Conclusions and further research 
 
The main contribution of this article is the development of an incomplete 
contracting model of the efficient governance structure of a franchise system. After 
laying out all possible governance structures, circumstances are identified when dual 
distribution in franchising is the unique equilibrium governance structure that induces 
investment by the various parties exactly when it is efficient to do so. Dual 
distribution franchising is the sub-game perfect equilibrium governance structure 
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when the dual distribution externalities are significant and the cost of investment is 
not too large for the parties involved. Whether the dual distribution benefits are 
realized in a traditional franchise or a cooperative franchise depends on whether most 
value is added upstream or downstream. A disadvantage of dual distribution is the 
deterioration of the investment incentives of the party having no authority, i.e. either 
the company-owned outlet manager in a traditional franchise or the franchisor in a 
cooperative franchise. A wholly-franchised system may therefore be efficient even 
when unique dual distribution benefits are present. A necessary condition for the 
efficiency of a dual distribution governance structure is a positive systemic effect (), 
not the value of the brand name (A-k1) or location (or other) differences between 
outlets (B-k2 and C-k3). 
A key distinction between our theory and preceding work regarding franchising 
is that we account explicitly for all possible governance structures. This is valuable 
because the existing literature provides explanations as to why wholly owned or 
wholly-franchised structures exist, but not a mixed system (e.g. Lutz 1995). 
Additionally, an incomplete contracting perspective on franchising is advanced, while 
the marketing literature on franchising and channels has chiefly used complete 
contracting (principal-agent) models (e.g. Lal 1990). Finally, many analyses of 
franchise systems consider the incentives to invest for either the franchisor or the 
distributors. Our model provides a unified treatment of the incentive to invest for the 
franchisor as well as the distributors. 
Further research may be guided by extending the model in various directions. A 
number of possibilities are formulated. First, actual franchise systems exhibit a 
substantial power asymmetry between small franchisees and the large franchisor. One 
way of restoring the balance of power is by erecting a franchisee council (Ehrmann 
and Spranger 2007) and to study the optimal allocation of rights to them. Our model 
can be tailored in a straightforward way to this issue by modeling countervailing 
power as an association of various distributors. Second, our framework seems also to 
be suitable for analyzing multiple unit franchising, i.e. a franchise system with 
franchisees owning several outlets. 
Third, we assume that the efficient governance structure emerges in the first 
stage of the game. This is a good assumption to start an analysis of governance 
structure choice, because a competitive market in governance structures will lead to 
displacing the relatively inefficient governance structures by the relatively efficient 
ones. It is also convenient because it eliminates the need for specifying a decision 
sequence in the first stage of the game. However, there is often a tension between 
efficiency and distributional / strategic considerations. Efficiency may dictate a drastic 
change in governance structure, but the distributional implications may prevent that 
the change occurs. 
Fourth, the model considers only the allocation of ownership. Ownership is a 
crude instrument to align interests. Many franchises spend considerable effort in 
designing appropriate franchisee incentive schemes, including franchise fee, royalty 
rates, preventing free riding by the franchisees on the brand name, and monitoring.16 
Decision and income rights have therefore to be considered simultaneously in the 
choice of governance structure.17  
                                               
16
 Bradach and Eccles (1989) highlight the multiplicity of control mechanisms  already. 
17
 Examples are Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) address the complementarity between decision and 
income rights, Bai and Tao (2000) formulate a multitasking model of franchising with the tasks of 
providing local service and providing effort towards generating goodwill, and Windsperger and 
Yurdakul (2007) show that dual distribution may alleviate incentive conflicts by assigning a proportion 
 16 
Fifth, the extent of incompleteness is not endogenous in our model. A franchise 
has to decide how much discretion regarding activities is assigned to the franchisees. 
The standard way of dealing with this issue in franchises is the choice of the business 
format. Croonen (2005) shows that the extent of coverage of the business format 
varies considerably between enterprises. Modeling the extent of coverage of the 
business format along the lines of Tadelis (2002) is a challenging line of future 
research. 18 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
of company-owned outlets to the franchisor in order to increase his weak investment incentives due to 
the strong investment incentives of a low royalty rate. The empirical result of Lafontaine and Shaw 
(2005) that dual distribution of established franchises is stable over time, i.e. the percentage of 
company ownership remains fixed after the early years in franchising and firms change their number of 
both company-owned and franchised outlets as they grow or decline, seems to be in line with systemic 
effects in dual distribution franchising. 
 
18
 The standard modelling of complete and incomplete contracts represent two extremes (Bajari and 
Tadelis, 2001). The cost of specifying an additional state of nature in complete contracting models is 
zero, whereas it is infinite in incomplete contracting models. Most realistic is that positive, finite costs 
are incurred by specifying an additional contractual clause, having an impact on the choice of 
governance structure.  
 17 
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Appendix: Governance structure and payoffs 
This appendix formulates the extensive form of the game. A governance 
structure is in our model an allocation of bargaining power. One way to represent 
bargaining power differences between governance structures in a consistent way is the 
Shapley value. Section A1 is dedicated to determining the Shapley value of each 
governance structure. These Shapley values are used to specify the payoffs in the 
extensive form. Section A2 presents the extensive form. 
 
A1. Shapley values 
The Shapley value is an equilibrium concept in cooperative game theory. A 
cooperative game consists of the characteristic function (N,v), where N is the set of 
players and v specifies a payoff for every possible subset of the set of players. The 
characteristic function depends on the choice of governance structure (G) and the 
choice of investment (x) of the involved parties. Define the vector x = (x1, x2, x3), 
where x1 (x2, x3) is the investment level by party 1 (2, 3). If a party invests (does not 
invest), then xi is equal to 1 (0). 
Table A1 presents the characteristic function of all governance structures when 
all parties invest, i.e. x=(1,1,1). For example, the value of a coalition consisting of 
only the franchisor, i.e. v(1), is A+B in governance structure II because the 
franchisor owns his own assets and the assets of party 2. A coalition consisting of 
only party 2 has no value in governance structure II because this coalition owns no 
assets. The value of a coalition consisting of the parties 1 and 3, i.e. v(13), is 
A+B+C because together they own all assets. The value of the coalition of the 
parties 1 and 3 is identical to the value of the coalition of all players, i.e. v(13) is equal 
to v(123), because party 2 adds no value to the coalition of the players 1 and 3 in 
governance structure II. The change from governance structure I to governance 
structure II shows the effect of a dual distribution governance structure. 
 
x (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
G I II III IV V VI VII 
v(1) A+B+C A+B A+C A 0 0 0 
v(2) 0 0 B B A/2+B A+B B 
v(3) 0 C 0 C A/2+C C A+C 
v(12) A+B+C A+B A+B+C A+B A/2+B A+B B 
v(13) A+B+C A+B+C A+C A+C A/2+C C A+C 
v(23) 0 C B B+C A+B+C A+B+C A+B+C 
v(123) A+B+C A+B+C A+B+C A+B+C A+B+C A+B+C A+B+C 
Table A1: Characteristic function forms when all parties invest 
 
The characteristic function determines the way in which the revenues are 
allocated to the three parties. This allocation of the revenues is determined by 
calculating the equilibrium of a cooperative game by the Shapley value.19  These 
values / payoffs reflect the distribution of bargaining power. The economic 
interpretation of the Shapley value is that it provides a measure for the incentive 
                                               
19
 We use, like Hart and Moore (1990), the Shapley value in order to determine the value of each player 
in each governance structure for all combinations of investment decisions. For a noncooperative 
justification for the use of the Shapley value, see Gul (1989) and appendix A of Hart and Moore 
(1988).  
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intensity to invest. Table A2 presents the Shapley values belonging to the 
characteristic functions of table A1. 
 
x G Shapley value 
franchisor 
Shapley value 
seller B 
Shapley value 
seller C 
(1,1,1) I A+B+C 0 0 
(1,1,1) II A+B 0 C 
(1,1,1) III A+C B 0 
(1,1,1) IV A B C 
(1,1,1) V 0 A/2+B A/2+C 
(1,1,1) VI 0 A+B C 
(1,1,1) VII 0 B A+C 
Table A2: Shapley values when all parties invest 
 
A2. Extensive form 
The non-cooperative game of this paper consists of two stages. The first stage of 
the game consists of the choice of governance structure. There are seven possible 
governance structures. The second stage of the game consists of the investment 
decisions of the three players. Each player decides between investing and not 
investing in specific assets. The total number of possibilities is therefore 7x2x2x2=56. 
This is too much to present in one figure. The extensive form will therefore be 
presented in seven separate figures. The payoffs are composed of revenues and costs. 
The revenues are taken directly from table A2, while each player carries its costs of 
specific investments. For example, branch NYN in figure A1 corresponds to 
investment vector (0,1,0) in governance structure I, i.e. only party 2 invests. The 
investment of party 2 generates revenue B. Revenue B is allocated to the franchisor in 
governance structure I, while party 2 carries the costs k2. Table 1 presents the payoffs 
of the branch YYY of the figures A1-A7. 
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 Figure A2: Extensive form when governance structure II 
Figure A1: Extensive form when governance structure I 
 A+B+C-k1  A+B-k1 A+C-k1      A-k1         B+C               B       C               0        Payoff franchisor 
       -k2              -k2      0                0              -k2              -k2      0               0        Payoff Party 2 
       -k3               0      -k3               0              -k3               0       -k3             0        Payoff Party 3 
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A+C-k1        A-k1 A+C-k1    A-k1           C                 0     C                0       Payoff franchisor 
    B-k2        B-k2     0               0            B-k2         B-k2    0                 0       Payoff Party 2 
       -k3              0       -k3              0              -k3                0      -k3               0       Payoff Party 3 
Figure A3: Extensive form when governance structure III 
     A-k1           A-k1  A-k1          A-k1             0                0       0                0        Payoff Franchisor 
     B-k2           B-k2     0                0              B-k2           B-k2   0                0        Payoff Party 2 
     C-k3             0      C-k3             0              C-k3            0      C-k3            0        Payoff Party 3 
Figure A4: Extensive form when governance structure IV 
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A/2+B-k2  A/2+B-k2 A/2              0            B-k2           B-k2     0               0       Payoff Party 2   
A/2+C-k3       A/2  A/2+C-k3        0            C-k3             0      C-k3            0       Payoff Party 3   
 
Figure A5: Extensive form when governance structure V 
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Figure A6: Extensive form when governance structure VI 
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       -k1             -k1        -k1             -k1              0                    0       0                0       Payoff Franchisor 
    B-k2         B-k2   0                0            B-k2          B-k2   0                0      Payoff Party 2 
  A+C-k3        A    A+C-k3      A            C-k3             0     C-k3           0      Payoff Party 3 
Figure A7: Extensive form when governance structure VII 
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